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ABSTRACT
Two agents privately fund a public project, the cost of which
may be high or low with some known probability. Suppose the differ-
ence between the current and the (expected) future cost technology is
"small." Initially, agents behave as if the true project cost is high
for sure. Later on, however, agents may decide to fund the lower cost
alternative but prior to finding out whether that technology actually
becomes available. With "large" differences in the cost technologies,
a possible outcome is that agents make no contributions prior to the
resolution of uncertainty. The bargaining procedures are socially
inefficient since they can lead to over-funding of the project or to
unnecessary delays in its completion. In addition, the project may
not be completed if there is some probability that the high cost is
excessive.
(I
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JOINT PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS WITH
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT COSTS
I consider a model of private provision of a public good in an
incomplete information setting. The model is an extension of a recent
paper by Admati and Perry [1] (AP from now on) who considered, in a
perfect information economy, how two agents would jointly provide for
a discrete public good by making, in alternate periods, voluntary con-
tributions of any non-negative amount. The joint project is completed
and agents receive (identical) benefits if contributions are sufficient
to pay for it. However, contributions are not refunded, irrespective
of whether the project is completed or not. In this paper, an addi-
tional proviso made is that the cost of the project is not known
initially, but is only revealed after a fixed number of periods L.
Specifically, the project can be high or low cost with a known proba-
bility. Hence, the equilibrium solution of the bargaining game must
take into account both the usual free-rider problem as well as the
effects of cost uncertainty.
An important assumption underlying ray model states that the higher-
cost technology is currently available but the cheaper alternative
will not become available till period L, if at all. This implies that
agents have the option of completing the project at any time (even
before L) by contributing the higher amount. On the other hand, if
they only contribute up to the lower limit, the project will be delayed
at least L periods. This assumption allows a natural trade-off in
agents' funding strategies—to wit, ensuring earlier completion at
higher cost versus the possibility of having to pay less if the project
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is delayed. To illustrate, suppose the project can be completed with
a currently available mainframe computer. However, a new powerful
PC may appear on the market in a year's time capable of doing the same
job. Then the alternative strategies are: one, fund the higher-cost
mainframe and complete the job early; or two, gamble by funding the
cheaper PC. In this case, there is a delay of at least one year.
Then if the PC does become available, the job gets done cheaper but,
if not, additional funding will be required to buy the mainframe.
In their paper AP proved that, if players are impatient and the
disutility from making contributions is a strictly convex function,
there will be a generically unique number of periods in which the
joint project will be completed, although this completion time may
exceed the socially optimal level. With incomplete information, in-
tuition might suggest under-provision of the public good (as indicated
by Bagnoli and Lipraan [2])—or, in this context, additional delays in
project completion as agents withhold contributions prior to the cost
revelation period. While this type of inefficiency does occur, I show
that over-provision is also possible when agents complete the project
at the higher cost and forego the possibility of cheaper provision
when the lower cost technology materializes.
Further, in contrast to AP, I show that it is possible for the
project not to be completed. Suppose that the higher cost is high
enough to preclude project completion if this were known for sure, but
completion is feasible at the lower cost. Also suppose some small
positive contribution is made compulsory in period 1 (interpret this
as the minimum investment needed to learn the true cost in period L)
.
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Then, for "small" values of this investment the project will not be
completed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the AP model
while section 2 presents the incomplete information version. Sections
3 and 4 derive the first set of results pertaining to the case of low-
risk cost technology. The technology is defined to be low-risk if the
difference k between the high and the low cost is "small" in the sense
that, under perfect information, both technologies would lead to the
same equilibrium completion times. Suppose the project is long-lived,
so that the true cost will be revealed prior to completion. A sur-
prising result is that, prior to the revelation of uncertainty, agents
contribute as if costs were high for sure. Intuitively, if the lower
cost is realized in period L, agents may hope to save on their contri-
butions by an amount equal to k. In equilibrium, the contributions
sequence is increasing over time. Given the convexity of the cost
function, this implies that expected marginal savings in period L will
be greater if initial contributions levels are higher. There is
another equilibrium path where agents switch to funding the cheaper
technology in period (L-l)— i.e., before the cheaper technology will
be known to become available. Therefore, if agents' anticipation is
wrong and the higher cost is realized in period L, a re-switching
phenomenon occurs as contributions are adjusted to the higher level.
Section 5 is devoted to the risky technology case, i.e., when k is
"large" in the sense that, under perfect information, the lower cost
project would be completed in one period (although agents must still
wait L periods to realize its benefits). Here, one equilibrium path
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involves zero contributions prior to L. Section 6 derives the non-
completion result and characterizes the social inefficiencies of the
bargaining solutions. Section 7 concludes.
Section 1. The AP Model
There are two identical players one and two who move in alternate
periods to finish a project that costs K. V is the value of immediate
completion to each player. If c. is the contribution of player i at
time t and TC . is the total contribution of player i from the begin-
ning of the game up to period t then the game ends in T periods if the
following condition holds:
T T
TCJ + TC^ >_ K (1.1)
t T t T t
A history of length T is ({c. } ,, (c«) ,). c. = if it is not
the turn of player i to move in period t. A strategy for player i is
a function from each history after which it is his turn to move to a
contribution level. Players are assumed to be impatient—i.e., they
t T t Thave a time discount factor 5 < 1. An outcome is (T , {c. } , , {c« } .
)
where T = °° if the project is not completed. A payoff for each player
is defined by
T
U.(T, CcJ^.j, tc^>t = i> =
<$T" 1
v ~ E « W(cJ). (1-2)
W( •) is the effort function. It is assumed to be increasing and
strictly convex with W(0) = 0. Further, V > .
Dl .
1
The extensive form game described above will be known as the AP
game with respect to K.
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Admati and Perry [1] set oat to find the sub-game perfect equi-
librium (SPE from now on) of this game. They define a sequence of
00
critical contribution levels {R } n where
q q=0
R
Q
= (1.3)
Rj = W
_1
{V(l-5)} (1.4)
R = w"
1 {V.5 2n
~ 3 (l-6 2 )} for n > 2 (1.5)
n —
R, is the maximum amount such that player i is indifferent between
(i) contributing R, and completing the game today and (ii) investing
0, letting player j * i contribute R, and complete the project tomor-
row. By recursion R is a level of contribution that makes player i
indifferent between the following options:
n-1
(i) contribute R
,
so that I R is left to be invested and from then
q-0 q
on player j * i contributes R ,, i contributes R ~, etc. until ther J J n-1' n-2'
project is completed.
n
(ii) contribute 0, so that £ R remains to be invested and from then
q=o
i
on player j * i contributes R , i contributes R , , etc. until ther J J
n n-1
project is completed.
Consider the contributions sequences implied by (i) and (ii).
Player one's disutility from contributing instead of R in period 1
are: (1) a one-period delay in project completion time and (2) a
change in the sequence of contributions. By definition, the net
disutility—which 1 will call the delay cost—must be equal to W(R ).
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Also, the R f s themselves are just numbers and so independent of K.
q
Remark 1.1 summarizes these observations.
Remark 1.1 (a) W(R ) measures the disutility of a one-period delay
in project completion relative to period q. (b) The contribution
levels R are independent of project costs. (c) For q _> 2,
W(R , ) = 6 W(R ) and so is decreasing in q. R„ 2. R, according as
q+1 q 2 < 1
6 2 5* where <5* = 0.62. 2
<
Let N* be the unique integer satisfying the following condition:
(1.6)
N*-l N*
E R < K < E R
q=0 q=0
Dl .2 The SPE of the A.P game with respect to K is given as follows.
(i) Suppose £ R > K.
q=0
N*
rer is
(a) If E R > K then the unique equilibrium path is
q=0 q
N*-l
c. = K - E R
,
c^ = R. T+ .. for 1 < t < N* if it is play<
1 „ q l N*-t+l — r j
q=0
turn to move in period t. The project is completed in N* periods.
N*
(b) If E R = K then there are two equilibrium paths. In addition
q=0
to (a) above there is another path with c. = and after that the game
N*-l
continues as in (a) with c = K - £ R .
2
q =o
i
(ii) Z R < K, in which case c. = for all i and all t. The proj-
q=0 q
"
ect is left incomplete.
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Remark 1.2 Suppose N*
_> 2, player one's equilibrium payoff in part
N*-l2N*-3 2N*-1
(ia) is 5 V - W(K - Z R ) and it is 5 V in part (ib) of
q= ° 2N*-2
D1.2. Player two's equilibrium payoff in (ia) is 6 V.
Section 2. Bargaining with Uncertain Costs
The A.P model described in section 1 is modified by assuming that
the project cost K is unknown to both players. However, it is common
knowledge that K has the following distribution:
K = K, with probability (1-p)
K- with probability p (2.1)
It is also common knowledge that K will become known after L
periods. Agents enjoy the benefit of the project as soon as it is
completed. The project is deemed to be completed in period t when
either TcJ + Tc!j _> Kh and t < L
or Tc5 + Tc!: > K. with K = K.
1 2 - j j
and t > L for j = h,£ (2.2)
Eq. (2.2) states that the players have current access only to the
expensive technology. The lower-cost technology will not be available
before period L, if at all.
Let c. . be player i's contribution in period t if it is known that
the true cost is K.. Let c. be this contribution when the true cost
J I
is not known. Three types of histories can then be discerned. Let
S(n) be a history of length n. Suppose the project is completed be-
fore L periods. Then:
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S(T) = ({cj}^) icpl^) where T < L.
Suppose the project is still incomplete at the end of period L-l.
Define T. > L as the smallest number of periods in which the total
J
-
contributions of the two players exceed K. , for j = h,£. Note that
T, > T-. Then:
h — t
sct.) = ( {c\}\:i (4}\z\ t {C^iL , {c^.}^, k.),
j = h,A.
If the project is completed in T < L periods, then an outcome is
( {c. } . , {c« } , , T) and player i receives:
T
VT ' {c l } t=l' (C2^=1 ) = <ST_1 V - E fi'^WCcJ) (2.3)
t=l
If the project is completed in T.
_> L periods then an outcome is
0. - ({cj^}, {c^}, ic\.}llL , l4.}% T., K.) for j = h,«a«d
player i's expected payoff is:
U.(0 h , £ ) = (l-p)[5
h
V - I 6
t ~ 1
W(cJh )]
t=L
V 1 T * t-1 t
+ p[5 V - E 6C lW(c^ £)]
t=L
L-l
- E 5* Vc*) (2.4)
t = l
1
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Section 3. The Solution for Low-Risk Technology
When Projects Are Long-Lived
Let H be the unique integer which satisfies:
H-l H
E R < K. < E R (3.1)
q=0 q ^"q=0 q
This means that the project will be completed in H periods if costs
were K, for sure. Now consider the situation H
_> L. Condition (2.2)
implies that, irrespective of whether costs are high or low ex-post,
it will take at least L periods for completion. I call such projects
long-lived. Analogously, section 4 deals with shorter-duration
projects—i.e., when H < L. Now assume that the technology is low-
risk in the following sense.
D3.
1
Define k = (fcL -K
p
). The technology is low risk if:
E R < K. < K, < E R (3.2)
q=0 q ~
l ^~q=0 q
which implies that k
_< R„. Since R is decreasing in q for q _> 2
,
(3.2) implies that projects with longer equilibrium completion times
will have smaller cost differences.
Define the following contribution and probability functions:
H-l
C.(H) = K. - E R for j = H,L (3.3)
2 J q=0 q
H-l
C, (H) = k - E R
k qq=0 4
[W(C, ) - W(C J]
q' (H)
-
-
«(RH )
(3 - 4)
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Notice that C.(H) is the period 1 contribution in equilibrium when
the cost is K. for sure and project completion is in H periods. From
now on, the functional dependence of C. on H will be suppressed unless
a specific value of H is referred to.
Next, 1 will define three contributions sequences: (HS), the high
contributions schedule, arises when in periods before L agents con-
tribute as if costs were high for sure; (LS) and (OS), the low contri-
butions schedule and the zero contributions schedule, respectively,
differ from (HS) in that the period 1 contributions are low (i.e.,
C.) or zero:
(HS) C
=
C
; ftUij Rh-2» *"' ^-[,+2 * Up t0 P eriod (L_1 ^ in period
i Vwi if * ' \ or (RH-L+rk) if * = V ; Vi R i }
from period (L+l) till H.
(LS) C. = C. and then follow (HS) from period 2. That is,
{k, Ru_,, ••, ^-t+t^ UP t0 period (L-l); {RR +« if K = K^ or
(R„_L+2 - k) if K = K } in period L; (Ru_ T + i> ..., R, ) from
period (L+l) till period (H+l).
(OS) C = and then follow (HS) from period 2.
Observe that when L = 2 and p = ql(H), player one is indifferent
between the high contributions schedule (HS) and the low contributions
schedule (LS). To see this, rewrite (3.4) as [ 1-ql (H) ]W(R„) =
W(C,) - W(C ). The right-hand side (henceforth RHS) of the expression
is the gain in utility from funding the cheaper technology C. in
1•i
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period 1. The left-hand side (LHS from now on) is the expected dis-
utility due to the one-period delay in project completion if C
g
is
paid in period 1 but the high cost is realized in period L. [l-ql(H)]
is the probability of K, being realized while W(R„) is the disutility
from having the project completed in H rather than H+l periods (see
Remark 1.1, part a).
The equilibrium is derived with the help of a lemma. Let G(T,N)
denote the sub-game where the project can be completed in N periods
if costs were K, for sure and the true cost will be revealed after Th
periods
.
Remark 3.1 In G(0,N) (i.e., all sub-games starting from period L),
the AP result defined in D1.2 can be applied directly since from
period L costs are known with certainty.
The following lemma says that, after any history such that the
players are in a G(2,H) sub-game and H ^ 2, they may switch their
funding strategy from (HS) to (LS) if p is high enough.
Lemma 3.1 Let L = 2 and H >_ L.
(i) If p < ql(H), then the SPE path is (a) (HS) when C, < R,.
The project is completed in H periods. (b) (HS) and (OS) when
C, = R, . Completion is in (H+l) periods for (OS).
(ii) If p > ql(H), the unique SPE path is (LS) and the project is
completed in (H+l) periods.
(iii) If p = ql(H), then the SPE paths are (a) (HS) and (LS) if
C
h
< R^ and (b) (HS), (OS) and (LS) when Ch
= R
R
.
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Proof First, I show that C, , C. and are the only period 1 contri-
butions that occur in any SPE. Consider c. = x where C „ < x < C, .
1 i h
Then the amount of project cost remaining to be invested in period 2
H-l
is (K
h
-x) if K = Kh or (K £-x) if K = K £ . But £ P^ < (Kh~x) _<
q=0
H H H-2 H-l
( E R -x) < Z R and £ R < (K.-x) < Z R . So, applying the Ai>
q=0 q q=0 q q=0 q * q=0 q
result, player one's contributions sequence from period 3 will be
identical to the corresponding sequence in (LS). Since C
?
< x, x will
never be contributed in period 1 in an SPE.
Similarly, consider < y < C ? . The amount of project cost re-
H-l
maining in period 2 is (K -y) or (K -y). Since E R < (K.-y) <
H q=0 q
(K -y) < E R
,
player one's contributions sequence from period 3
h
q=0 q
x
will match that of (OS) and so c. =0 will always be preferred to y
in any SPE.
Next, compare (HS) and (OS). Player one gains W(C, ) in period 1
from following (OS) but at the expense of delaying project completion
by one period—entailing a disutility of W(R U ) according to Remark 1.1,
ri
When C, < R„
,
(HS) is preferred; when C, = R„
,
player one is indif-
ferent between (HS) and (OS).
Finally, compare (HS) and (LS). As mentioned previously, when
p = ql(H) player one is indifferent between (HS) and (LS). When
p < ql(H), [l-p]W(R ) > [W(C,) - W(C-)] and so (HS) is preferred. The
rest of the lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 3.1 suggests that a path in which players contribute accord-
ing to (LS) from period (L-l) should be a candidate SPE profile. So
define these contributions sequences:
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(HLS) Follow (HS) up to period (L-2) and (LS) from (L-l).
(LLS) Follow (LS) throughout.
(OLS) Follow (OS) up to period (L-2) and (LS) subsequently.
Now suppose agents are making a choice between following (HS) and
(HLS). Up to period (L-2) the paths are identical. So consider the
sub-game beginning at period (L-l). The player who moves in that
period gains [W(R„ „) - W(R„_
T
^-k)] i- n period (L-l) by switching
from (HS) to (HLS). If costs are revealed to be low in period L, then
the lower funding is justified and entails no delay. But if costs
turn out to be high, then with probability (1-p) there is a disutility
of W(R„_
T
«) suffered due to a one-period delay in project completion
relative to period H. Suppose these costs and benefits balance
exactly when p = q2(H,L). Then:
q2(H,L) = " L ' (3.5)
VnKH-L+2 ;
The previous discussion indicates what the equilibrium path may
look like. The expected period L cost savings if (HS) is the equi-
librium path (agents act as if costs were high for sure) must be
p6 [W(R „) - W(R„~-k)]. Since R is increasing in q and W(x) is
strictly convex, this is the maximum possible cost savings that could
be expected in period L. Proposition (3.1) confirms this intuition.
Proposition 3.1 Let L ^> 3 and H ^ L. Suppose the technology is low
risk in the sense of D3.1. Assume that k satisfies the lower bound
defined below in (3.8) and 6 < 0.62 (which implies R. > R-). Then:
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(i) if L is odd and (a) p <_ q2(H,L) then the high contributions
schedule (HS) is the unique SPE path. The project is completed in H
periods, (b) If p > q2(H,L) and C, < R„ , (HLS) is the unique SPE
path. The project is completed in (H+l) periods if K = K, and H
periods if K = K.. When C. - R„, an additional SPE path is (OLS).
(ii) If L is even and (a) p _< q2(H,L), then (HS) is the unique SPE
path when C, < R„. In addition, (OS) is also a SPE path when C, = R, .
(b) If p > q2(H,L), then (HLS) is the unique SPE path.
Proof Consider L = 3, H >^ L. If agents are choosing between (HS) and
(HLS), it follows from the discussion prior to equation (3.5) that the
choice will be:
(HS) cj = C and then i'K.,, (RH_ 2 if K
= Kh or ^-2^ if K = K j^ >
R _, ..., R, } from period 2 if p < q2(H,3); and
H~ J 1
(HLS) c. = Ch and then {R^_ -k, (k or RR_ 2 )» (RH-2 or ^-l^ "•"»
(R
x
or 0)} from period 2 if p > q2(H,3).
Suppose agents are choosing between (LS) and (LLS). c. = C» in
both paths. In period 2, player two gains W(k) by deviating to (LLS)
but loses (l-p)W(R u ) since the project is delayed by one period (rela-n
tive to period H) if costs are high. If these gains and losses are
offset at p = q3(H) then:
q3(H) = 1 - W(k)
W(R
H
)
(3.6)
Therefore agents select
-18-
(LS) c = C. and Chen {k
,
(R
.
or IL_,-k),
^u-o » "'> R l ^ from
period 2 till (H+l) if p <_ q3(H); and
(LLS) c. = C
£
and then {0, (k or RR-1 ), (RH_! or Rh-2^' '"'
(R
2
or R^, (R
1
or 0)} from period 2 till (H+2) if p > q3(H).
Similar reasoning shows if c, = 0, agents select between (OS) and
(OLS) in the following manner:
(OS) c, = and then {C,
,
(R„_, or RH_-|-k), RH_ 2 > •••» R i ) from
period 2 till (H+l) if p <_ql(H); and
(OHS) c, = and then {C., (k or L_.), (RH-i or RH-2^' '**'
(R
2
or R
L
), (Rj or 0)} from period 2 till (H+2) if p > ql(H).
The following observations indicate that (HS), (HLS), (LS), (LLS),
(OS) and (OLS) are the candidate SPE strategy profiles: (1) From
period 2, the sub-game is G(2,N) with N
_> 2 so that Lemma 3.1 can be
applied directly. (2) The project will be completed since, by Lemma
3.1, once period 2 is reached, all possible equilibria involve com-
pleting the project. (3) The only relevant period 1 actions for
player one are C,
,
C. and (the proof is similar to the one used in
Lemma 3.1 and so is omitted). Further the probabilities are related
in this way:
q2(H,3) ' q3(H) > ql(H) (3.7)
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To show (3.7), note that W(k) < [W(C h >
- W(C^)] since
W(x+y) > W(x) + W(y) and so q3 > ql. For q2(H,3) > q3(H) it is neces-
sary that:
5
2
W(RU ,-k) - W(RU ) + W(k) > (3.8)ti—In —
(3.8) is an assumption since it may be negative for small values of k
when W(«) is strongly convex. Effectively, (3.1) places a lower bound
2
2V 2
on k. As an example, if W(x) = x , k >. ~— is needed. On the other
1 + 6
hand, if either W is linear or k = R„ then (3.8) is always positive.
Suppose p <_ ql(H). By observation, player one strictly prefers
(OS) to (LS). Comparing (OS) and (HS), player one would benefit by
W(C.) in period 1 by deviating to (OS) but would suffer disutility
equal to W(R„) due to the one-period delay in project completion. In
addition, under (HS), there is a "cost savings" equal to
2
p5 [W(RU ) - W(R -k)] realized if K = K„ instead of K, in period 3.H.— Z rl- Z x. h
2
The amount of these "cost savings" is p<5 [W(R ) - W(RU ,-k)] under
rl— 1 n.— 1
(OS). Since W(») is strictly convex and R is decreasing in q, these
"savings" are greater under (HS). So, for C, <_ R„, player one re-
ceives strictly greater utility under (HS).
Suppose p e (ql(H) q3(H)]. Clearly (HS) is preferred to both (LS)
and (OS). Further player one prefers (OS) to (OLS) since under (OS)
2H— 1
player one derives utility equal to 5 V (see Remark 1.2) plus "cost
2
savings" equal to p6 [W(RU ,) - W(RU ,-k)] in period 3, but gets only
2H— 1 2
6 V - (l-p)6~W(k) under (OLS). To see this, replace k with in
period 3 of the (OLS) sequence. From Remark 1.2, player one's utility
-20-
is p<5
2H_1
V when K = K
£
and (1-p ) 6 2 ( 52H
~ 3
V) when K = K,. When
p z (q3(H) q2(H,3)], (HS) is again the preferred choice because (OLS)
is preferred to (LLS) by observation. This proves (ia) of the propo-
sition for L = 3.
Let p > q2(H,3) and compare (HLS) and (OLS). Player one's gain
from a deviation to (OLS) is W(C, ). If K = K
?
,
then the disutility
from delay is p.W(R ). If K = K, , without loss of generality put
k = in both sequences and apply Remark 1.2 to the sequence starting
from period 3. This calculation yields an additional disutility of
(1-p) 6 w(R„ .) = (l-pW(Ru ). Part (ib) of the proposition follows
n.— 1 rl
immediately.
Next, the induction argument is used to generalize the proof.
Suppose p _< q2(H,L) and the result holds, for L = T, H >^ L and T is
odd. Then (HS) is the unique SPE path. Consider L = (T+l) and N
_> L
where N = H+l. Note that L is even, so player one does not move in
period L and does not realize any "cost savings." The candidate pro-
files are (HS), (LS) and (OS). (OS) is always preferred to (LS).
Without the "cost savings," player one prefers (HS) to (OS) if
C, < R^ and is indifferent between the two when C, = R„. If T is
even and C,< R„ , then (HS) is again the unique SPE path but L is odd
so that player one does obtain the "cost savings" which makes (HS)
unique in the G(L,N) game also. When T is even and C, = R„
,
(OS) is
also a SPE path in G(T,H). In the G(L,N) game, this induces an addi-
1 2tional candidate profile with c, = C, and c~ = 0. Clearly, since
player one can always deviate to 0, this will never be a SPE path.
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If p > q2(H,L), then (HLS) is the unique SPE in the G(T,H) game
when T is odd and C, < R„. As always, (LLS) is ruled out in G(L,N).
Comparing (HLS) and (OLS), observe that L is even and so player one
moves in period (L-l) when the switch to the lower funding strategy
L-2
is accomplished. This ensures "savings" equal to 6 [W(R _) -
W(R
R_L+2-k)] under (HLS) and 6
L~ 2 [W(R
H_L+3 )
- W(R
H_L+3~k)] in period
L-l. Again, "savings" are greater under (HLS) because Ru T , -> > R„ T .~H—L+Z rl—L+J
when H
_> L and W(«) is convex, and so (HLS) is the unique SPE path.
If T is even, then (HLS) is the unique SPE path in G(T,H). But L is
odd, so player one does not move in period (L-l) and cannot enjoy any
"savings" in that period. Therefore, for C, = R^
,
(HLS) and (OLS)
yield the same utility to player one. Otherwise, for C, < R„
,
(LHS)
is strictly preferred. This completes the proof.
Discussion : I have already discussed the intuition behind the (HS)
equilibrium path. Now consider the equilibrium path (HLS) which is
relevant for large values of p. Notice that here agents switch to
funding the lower cost technology in period (L-l), one period before
finding out about its availability. This leads to a re-switching
phenomenon in period L if the lower cost technology does not appear
and funding must revert to the more expensive alternative.
Section 4. Equilibrium for Short-Lived Projects
When there is uncertainty about project costs, an important ele-
ment determining equilibrium is the projected cost savings in period L
if the low cost is realized. If H < L and the project is sufficiently
valuable, however, players may decide to forego these cost savings and
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always complete the project prior to period L by funding the costly
technology. Ex-post, therefore, it may turn out that players will
have contributed more than the amount necessary to complete the
project. In this section, I derive conditions under which there will
be early completion regardless of p.
When H < L, the high contributions profile (HS) take the following
special form:
(HS ) IC, , Ru_ i > • • • » ""i J
Suppose H = 3 and L = 7. If players follow (HS) and finish the
project in three periods, player one receives at least 5 V (see
Remark 1.2). If player one contributes in period 1 and delays com-
pletion by one period, he can do no better than receive 6 V, as we
know from the AP result. If the strategy is such that there is a two-
period delay, then player one will do strictly worse. To see this,
note that with a two-period delay player one must finish the project
4 4 5
in period 5 by contributing R. which yields [5 V - 5 W(R ) ] = 6 V.
Since he must also contribute something in the earlier periods, he
will get an amount less than 6 V. However, if the project is suf-
ficiently delayed so that the game reaches period L, player one can
expect some cost savings if K = K in period L. Depending on parameter
values, these cost-savings may more than offset the cost of delay.
This suggests the following alternative strategies: contribute nothing
for (L-H) periods and then follow (HS) so that the project is com-
pleted in exactly L periods. Call this contributions sequence (DC)
for delayed completion:
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(DC) {0 for (L-H) periods and then follow (HS). The path is C, in
period (L-H+l); then Rui, •••, R? up t0 Perioc* (L-l); R, if
K = K^ or (R
x
-k) if K = K
£
in period L}.
Note that the period L "savings" are only available to player one
if L is odd. However, analogous to the (OLS) sequence in section 3,
one can define a variant of (DC) in which player one switches to the
low funding strategy (LS) in period (L-l) as follows:
(DCL) {0 for (L-H) periods and then follow (HLS). The path is C,,
R ., ..., R~ up to period (L-2); (R -k) in period (L-l);
H—13 2.
< cl
= k and Vi = V i£ * ' h or cl = R i " V-
Under (DCL), player one can benefit from the "savings" in period
(L-l) of an amount equal to [W(R~) - W(R~-k)]. Now suppose L is odd
and player one must choose between the paths (HS) and (DC). First,
suppose (L-H) is odd so that under (DC) player one contributes
^^u_i > ^h-v •••) from period (L-H+2). If player one deviates to
(DC), the period 1 gain is W(C.) and the expected period L "savings"
is p. 6 [W(R,) - W(R,-k)]. Against this, there is a delay of (L-H)
periods relative to period H. Ignoring the period 1 contribution
(which is already accounted for), player one derives utility worth
2H—
3
T —H+l 2H—
3
3
<5 V under (HS) and 6 .6 V under (DC). So the cost of delay
2H— 3 T —H+
1
is 5 V(l-6 ). Now, let (L-H) be even so that under (DC) player
one contributes {Ch , \_ 2> ...} from period (L-H+l). Therefore his
disutility from the (L-H) period delay relative to (HS) is now
<S^
n J
v - 5 (5 V - W(C
h )).
So, if q4(H,L) is the probability
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value such that player one is indifferent between (HS) and (DC) in
these two cases then:
(5
2H" 3
V - W(C ))(1-6L
~H
)
q4(H,L) = r^ if (L-H) is even (4.1)
5 [W(R.) - W(R -k)] and L is odd
;
2H" 3
v(i-5L
"H+1
) - W(C. )
n
if (L-H) is odd
5
L~ 1 [W(R
1
) - W(R
1
-k)] and L is odd
Similarly, when L is even, one can evaluate player one's choice
between the paths (HS) and (DCL). The only difference with the pre-
vious calculation is that player one now moves in period (L-l) and
L-2
"saves" p. 5 [W((R
2
>
- W(R
2
~k)]. Define q5(H,L) as the probability
value such that player one is indifferent between (HS) and (DCL).
Then:
(6
2H" 3
V - W(C ))(1-6L
"H
)
q5(H,L) = j—
2
if (L~H) is even (4.2)
5
~ [W(R ) - W(R -k)] and L is even
5
2H" 3
V(1-6L
"H+1
) - W(C.)
n
if (L-H) is odd
5
L
~ [W(R ) - W(R -k)] and L is even
Suppose H = (L-l) and L = 3. In this case, the path (DC) is identical
to the path (OS) which was defined earlier as the sequence {c = 0; then
follow (HS) from period 2}. Similarly, (DCL) is identical to (OLS).
If C
h (H)
= Ry, then the A.P result states that (HS) and (DC) yield the
same payoff to player one in a full-information world. With uncer-
tainty, however, player one also "saves" in period L under (DC) and so
(DC) yields strictly higher payoffs. The implication is that, if
c = C (H) then in the period 2 sub-game G(L-1 , H-l), since C,(H-1) = R^
,
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it must be true that the optimal period 2 contribution is 0. In other
words, when H = (L-l) the high contributions sequence (HS) can never
occur in any SPE. The following lemma states that when H = (L-l) the
SPE paths are either (DC) or (DCL). Further (DCL) is chosen when p > q*,
where q* = q2(H,H) = W(R
2
-k)/W(R
2
) . The reason is: if c, = the
period 2 sub-game is G(H-1 , L-l). In this sub-game, therefore, H = L
and agents either follow the high contributions sequence (HS) or
follow (HLS) by switching to the low funding strategy in period (L-l)
whenever p > q2(H,L) = q2(H,H) = q* (see the discussion on q2 in
section 3).
Lemma 4.1 Suppose H = (L-l). If (a) H = 3 and Ch = RR or (b) H > 3,
then the unique SPE path is (DC) for p <_ q* and (DCL) for p > q*
where q* = W(R
2
"k)/W(R
2
)
.
Proof See appendix.
What happens when H < (L-l)? First, notice that (HS) is the
3
unique SPE path when H = 2 because player one gets at least 5 V here
but since L
_> 4, player one's utility from (DC) or (DCL)—both of which
involves project completion in period L or after—must be strictly
3less than 6 V. In fact, this argument generalizes to any H
_< L/2,
as will be shown later. Second, suppose H = 3 and L = 5. If c. = C,
,
the period 2 sub-game is G(4,2) and so from the previous comment, (HS)
is the unique equilibrium. If c, = 0, the period 2 sub-game is G(4,3)
and Lemma 4.1 applies. So for p _< q*, the comparison is between (HS)
and (DC). If q4(3,5) < q*, then the discussion on q4 suggests that
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(HS) is preferred when p <^ q4(3,5) while (DC) is selected when p be-
longs to the closed interval [q4(3,5) q*]. Since L is odd, q5 is not
defined and (HS) is the unique SPE path for p > q*.
Finally, consider H = 4, L = 6. If c. = C, (4), then the period 2
sub-game is G(5,3) with C, (3) = R~. Define q 4 and q 5 as the value
of q4 and q5 when C, = R„. Or:
q 4(H,L) = =—:
:
when (L-H) is even (4.3)
5
L [W(R
X
) - W(R
1
-k)] and L is odd
5
2H" 1
V(1-5L
"H" 1
)
when (L-H) is odd
6
L~ 1 [W(R
1
) - W(R,-k)] and L is odd
p2H-l , . jfL~Hv
q 5(H,L) = -r^ ^^—2 when (L-H) is even (4.4)
6
" [W(R
2
) - W(R
2
-k)] and L is even
5
2H" 1 V(1-6L
"H" 1
)
when (L-H) is oddL-2
5 [W(R ) - W(R
2
-k)] and L is even
Applying the result from the previous paragraph to the G(5,3) sub-
game, (HS) must be the unique equilibrium path for p < q 4(3,5) and
p > q*. Now consider the whole game. Provided q* > q 4(3,5), (HS)
remains the SPE path for p < q_4(3,5). When p e [q_4(3,5) q*], the
— E E
choice is between (DC) and the sequence {c. = C, ; (DC) from period 2}.
Clearly (DC) is preferred by player one since it avoids the period 1
contribution of C,. For p > q*, the choice is between (DCL) and (HS)
and it follows from the definition of q5 that (DCL) is selected when
p >^ q5(4,6) (this assumes q5(4,6) > q*). The following proposition
generalizes this result.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose L/2 < H < (L-l) where H > 3 and the tech-
nology is low risk.
(i) Suppose L is odd and q 5(H-1, L-l) > q* > q4(H,L). Then the
unique SPE path is:
(a) (HS) if p < q4((H,L) or p e (q* q£ 5(H-l, L-l)),
(b) (DC) if p e (q4(H,L) q*] and
(c) (DCL) if p > q_5(H-l, L-l).
If p = q4(H,L), both (HS) and (DC) are SPE paths. If p - q_5(H-l, L-l),
both (HS) and (DCL) are SPE paths.
(ii) If L is even, everywhere substitute q_4(H-l. L-l) for q4(H,L)
Cj
and q5(H,L) for q 5(H-1, L-l). Then the equilibrium is identical to
(i).
Proof See appendix.
i
The proposition assumes that q* > q4 which implies that agents
choose to delay the project by (L-H) periods even when the probability
(and so the expected benefits) of the low cost being realized is rela-
tively small. However, it is also assumed that q5 > q*, which means
that the additional disutility from the further one-period delay suf-
fered when players follow (DCL) is relatively large. One implication
of these assumptions is that for intermediate probability ranges
players may do best by choosing the higher contributions profile (HS)
again (i.e., in addition to the choice of (HS) for low-probability
ranges). As p increases, therefore, players switch from (HS) to (DC)
then back to (HS) and finally to (DCL).
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When the first assumption is relaxed and q* < q4 , agents delay the
project and follow (DC) only for relatively large values of p. At
these large values of p, however, agents are better off switching to
the low-funding strategy in period (L-l) and so (DC) is never a SPE
path. (HS) is chosen for lower values of p and (DCL) for higher
values of p. This case is more likely the larger (L-H) is relative
to H. Intuitively, the delay involved in following the path (DC) is
large and must be compensated with a high probability p of the low
cost being materialized.
Conversely, if the second assumption is relaxed and q* > q5, then
for relatively low values of p agents find it optimal to possibly
delay the project (L-H+l) periods and follow (DCL). This implies that
the equilibrium where (HS) is chosen for intermediate values of p is
eliminated. As p increases, agents choose (HS) then (DC) and finally
(DCL). When (L-H) is small relative to H, this scenario is likely.
Lemma 4.1 is a special case where (L-H) = 1. Here qp 4 = and so
(DC) and (DCL) are the only equilibrium paths. Corollary 4.1 sum-
marizes these remarks.
Corollary 4.1 Suppose L/2 < H < (L-l), where H > 3 and the technology
is low risk. Suppose L is odd. (When L is even, read q 4(H-1, L-l)
for q4(H,L) and q5(H,L) for q_5(H-l, L-l)). If:
hi
(i) q 5(H-1, L-l) > q* and q4(H,L) > q*, then the unique SPE path
is (a) (HS) if p < q 5(H-1, L-l), (b) (DCL) if p > q E 5(H-l, L-l) and
(c) both (HS) and (DCL) at p = q 5(H-1, L-l).
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(ii) If q4(H,L) > q* > q_5(H-l, L-l), then (HS) is the unique SPE
hi
path for p _< q* and (DCL) for p > q*.
(iii) If q_5(H-l, L-l) > q* and q4(H,L) > q*, then the unique SPE
path is (a) (HS) if p < q4(H,L), (b) (DC) if p e (q4(H,L) q*],
(c) (DCL) if p > q* and (d) both (HS) and (DC) when p - q4(H,L).
The corollary and the discussion prior to it suggest that when
(L-H) is large relative to H, both q4 and q5 are large relative to q*.
In other words, the disutility involved in delaying the project is
significant relative to the expected benefits from "saving" in period
L or (L-l). Then for sufficiently large (L-H) relative to H, (HS)
should be the unique equilibrium. The next proposition formalizes
this intuition.
Proposition 4.2 If H
_< L/2, then (HS) is the unique equilibrium path.
The project is completed in H periods.
Proof Suppose (L-H) is even. For H < L/2, q„4(H,L) >
(V(1-5L
"H )/[W(R
1
) - W(R
1
-k)]} > 1 because V(1-5L
"H
) > V(l-S) = W(R
1
)
since (L-H) > 1. Similarly, qT7 5(H,L) > {<5V( 1-6
L~H
)/
[W(R
2
) - W(R -k)]} > 1 since 6V(1-<SL
~H
) > 5V(l-6
2
) = W(R
2
). Finally,
q4(H,L) > q_4(H,L) and q5(H,L) > q_5(H,L). Therefore (DC) and (DCL)
E E
yield higher payoffs than (HS) only if p > 1. When (L-H) is odd,
replace V(l-6 ) with V(l-5 )
_> W(R.). This completes the proof.
In fact, a stronger version of Proposition 4.2 holds, as shown
below.
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Corollary 4.2 Suppose players had the option that, if K = K , the
project could be completed in period L for free (no contributions
would be required before or at L). If H <_ L/2, then (HS) is still the
unique equilibrium path.
Proof First, from Proposition 4.2, (HS) constitutes an equilibrium
strategy for H <_ L/2.
Finally, by completing the project in H periods, player one gets
2H—
1
at least 6 V. Finishing the project in L periods costlessly
yields 6L_1 V. Clearly, 52H-1 V
_> 5
L_1
V for H^L/2.
Section 5. Risky Technology
In this section, I consider what happens when the cost technology
is risky in the sense that k, the difference between the costs, is
large. In particular K. < R. so that the project can be completed in
one period if costs were low for sure (although players must still
wait L periods to realize its benefits).
Suppose H >^ L, where H is as defined in (3.1). Let L = 2. If
c, = C, and K = K„, then M.(H), the amount of project costs remaining
to be financed in period 2 satisfies:
-^ < M
£
(H) < R
x
(5.1)
M (H) can lie in one of these two sub-intervals:
(a) <_ M£(H) < R L
(b) -R
R
< M
Z
(H) <
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Similarly, if c, = K. and K = K,
,
then k is the amount remaining
in period 2 and k satisfies:
H-l H
I R < k < E R (5.2)
q=2 « -q-1 «
k can lie in one of (H-l) possible sub-intervals indexed by I:
I 1+1
(c) £ R < k < E R
,
1= 1,2,. ...H-l
q=0 q -q-0 q
Note that conditions (a) and (b) also imply certain restrictions
on k and these must be consistent with the set of restrictions in (c).
This requirement leads to these two broad distinctions:
Case A: High funding includes conditions (b) and I = (H-l), both of
which imply the following restriction on k:
H-l H
E R < k < E R (5.4)
,-1 « "q-1 «
When (5.4) is satisfied C, > K. so that the period 1 funding is
larger when players follow the high contributions profile (HS) rather
than the low contributions profile (LS).
Case B: Low funding occurs under conditions (a) and I < (H-l). Here
C, <_ K. so that, when players anticipate costs to be high, in period 1
they contribute less relative to when they expect costs to be low.
In solving the model, 1 will assume that the high-funding case
holds. This is consistent with the low-risk technology model of
sections 3 and 4, where the relevant period 1 contributions were C,
and C„, and CL > C „ from (3.3).
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Define the following three contributions sequences:
(HOS) c
{0,0, ..., 0} if K = K^
(LOS) c
if
= C,; from period 2, {R,,, , ^u.o Rj} if K = K^ oi
= C-J then follow (HOS) from period 2: {C,, &H * i • ••, Ri)
K = Kor {0, 0, ..., 0} if K = K..
(00S) cj = 0; then follow (HOS) from period 2: {Ch , Rq., . .., Rj >
If K - K. or {K
£ ,
0, ..., 0}lf K-R,.
Also define:
P1(H) =
W(R
H )
- W(C
h )
W(R
H )
(5.5)
The next lemma solves all sub-games where L = 2,
Lemma 5.
1
(a) If H = 1, then the unique SPE involves completing the
game in one period by contributing K, .
(b) Let L = 2 and H >_ L.
(i) If P < P1(H), then the unique equilibrium path is HOS.
(ii) If P > P1(H), then the unique equilibrium path is 00S.
(iii) IF P = P1(H), both (i) and (ii) are SPE.
Proof First, it can be shown that C, , K. and are the only period 1
contributions that can occur in any SPE. For example, if c. = x where
< x < K , then from period 2 the equilibrium path is
{(C -x), R ..., R } or {(K -x), 0, ..., 0}; so c. =0 is strictly
n H— 1 1 Jc. 1
preferred. Second, player one strictly prefers contributing to K.
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in period 1 since from period 3 the paths are identical. Third, com-
paring (HOS) and (00S), player one's gain from the latter sequence is
a saving of W(C,) in period 1 but at the cost of a one-period delay
relative to period H if K = K, in period 2. From Remark 1.2, the
latter cost is precisely (l-p).W(R„) so that cost and gain are equal
at p = P1(H). This proves the lemma.
The intuition from Lemma 5.1 suggests that contributing K. prior
to period (L-l) will never be part of an SPE. Since only K is re-
quired to complete the project in period L and the benefits accrue
only in that period, waiting should be the best policy. Similarly,
contributing C, prior to period (L-l) is not a sub-game perfect
strategy for any player since in period (L-l), the contribution must
be zero. The next proposition formalizes this argument.
Proposition 5.
1
Suppose H ^> L and the technology is risky. If
K.
_> EL. . , then in the unique SPE players contribute for the first
(L-2) periods. From period L-l, the equilibrium path is HOS if
p <_ P1(H) and 00S if p > P1(H).
Proof . Suppose the proposition is true for L, where L is even and
H
_> L. Then the SPE path is for (L-2) periods and then for p <_ Pl(H)
{C,, Ft.,, ••., R, } If K K. in period L or {C,, 0, 0, ..., 0} if
K = K . If p > P1(H), the path is {0, Ch , \_ { , . . . , R, } if K = K,
or {0, K , 0, ... , 0} if K = K .
Now consider T = L+l and N = H+l. N
_> T and T is odd so that
player one moves in period L. The candidate profiles are, by the
induction hypothesis:
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(Ha) {C,; for (T-3) periods; R^ in period (T-l); and from period T
^RH-1' ^-2' ""» R l* if K
= K
h
or
°
if K = K
l }
(Hb) {C ; for (T-2) periods; {R^ R^,, ..., R, > or 0}
(La) (C
(Lb) {C
for (T-3) periods; c
k ; {R^ R . .., R } or 0}
for (T-2) periods; {Ck , R ..., R l } or 0}
(Oa) for (T-2) periods; Ch ; {R , Rtt i> •••, Rj) or 0}
(Ob) for (T-l) periods; {Ch , R , ..., R, } or {K £ ,0}}
First, consider the sub-game from period T-l. If c, = C,
,
(Hb) is
the unique path because is the unique choice in period (T-l). The
gain from contributing rather than C, is W(R ) and the loss (due to
n n
delay) only (l-p).W(R ). If c. = 0, player two switches from C, toH n
in period (T-l) if p > P1(H). If c. = K , the switch-over probability
is:
P2(H) =
W(R
R
) - W(C
R
)
W(R
R )
(5.6)
Note that P2 > PI for all H since C, < C, .k h
(i) Consider p <_ P1(H). 3y inspection the path (0a) is strictly
preferred to (Hb)—which is the unique path. The path (Oa) is also
strictly preferred to (La) by the same token. This proves Che result
for p _< P1(H).
(ii) Suppose p e [PI P2]. By inspection, (La) is strictly pre-
ferred to (Hb). It remains to be shown that (Ob) yields higher pay-
offs relative to (La). Comparing the two paths, player one's gain
from following (Ob) is a lower contribution level of
[W(K.) - p. 5 W(K.)]. The cost is a one-period delay relative to
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(La) which is (l-p).6 .W(C\). So, the probability level at which
player one is indifferent between (Ob) and (La) is:
5
L" 1
.W(C.) - W(K.)
P3(H,L)=-rn - — (5.7)
6
L" i [W(C
h )
- W(K
£ )]
If p < P3, then (La) is preferred. I will show that PI > P3 and,
since p > PI, (La) never occurs in any SPE. Showing PI >^ P3 is
equivalent to proving that:
W(K
Jl
)(l-6L
" 1
) 6
L~ 1
.W(C
h )
W(C
h )
- W(K
£
)
>
W(R
R )
(5,8)
W(KJ W(K ) 5 2 .W(C ) 6L
" 1
.W(C )
Now the LHS > „, * > „ * > tttz r >
- W(C
h )
- W(R
H
) - W(R
R
) W(R
H
)
I have used the fact that R„
_> C, and the assumption that K
p
_> R^ . .
(iii) For p >_ P2(H), I only need to show that (Ob) is preferred
to (Lb). It is sufficient to show that (La) yields higher payoffs
relative to (Lb). (Lb) involves a one-period delay relative to (La)
with disutility equal to (l-p).5 W(R ) . On the other hand, the
savings in contributions is only (l-p).5 [W(R ) - W(C, )]. This
proves the proposition.
For H < L, the result is a straightforward generalization of
Proposition 4.1. For valuable projects, the (HS) strategy of com-
pleting in H periods is still beneficial. The alternative (DCO) here
o
is to contribute for (L-l) periods and then following the AP path.
Define:
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6
2H~3
V(i-6L
~1
) - W(C )(1-6L
" 1
)
P4(H,L)=-rn - (5.9)
5
L
tW(C
h )
- v7(K
£
) + V(l-6Zd J )]
P4(H,L) has the following interpretation. Suppose H = L-l. If
p = P4(H,L), then player one is indifferent between following (HS) and
(DCO) because the benefit from early completion (equal to
2H— 3 L—
1
L~l
5 V(l-5 ) - W(C, )(l-5 ) is equal to the expected gains foregone
from lower contributions if K = K. in period L (equal to
T — 1 2H— 3
p. 5 V(l-r J ) + W(C h ) - W(K.)). Let P* = P4(2,3) and let PE* be P*
evaluated at C.(2) = R
2
and at K
£
= 0. Then PE* = W(R
2
/[W(R ,) + W(R
2 )!
9
Proposition 5.2 Suppose H < L and K. ^> ^u+i •
(i) If p < PE*, (HS) is the unique SPE.
(ii) If p > PE*, (DCO) is the unique SPE.
(iii) If p = PE*, both (HS) and (DCO) are SPE.
Proof First consider the case H = 2, L = 3. Applying Lemma 5.1, it
is easy to see that following are the candidate SPE paths:
(HS) {C
h ,
R
L
>
(DCO) {0, 0, (C h or K £ ), (K y or 0)} if p > Pl(2).
(DC) {0, C h , (R or 0)} if p <_ Pl(2).
(La) {Kr Ck , (R 1 or 0)} for p < P2(2).
(Lb) {K
£
, 0, (C or 0), (R
L
or 0)} for p > P2(2).
Note that P2(2) > Pl(2) by definition. Suppose p <_ P2(2). By
observation, player one prefers (DC) to (La). Evaluating player one's
utility from (DC) at the point p = Pl(2) yields U. = [W(R«) - W(C )] •
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<5 W(R ) -
+ 5 V.
W(R
2
)
Since U7 < [6V W(C, )], player one's utility from
(HS), (HS) is the unique equilibrium path for p _< Pl(2).
Next, consider p > Pl(2). Clearly, the path (DCO) is strictly
preferred to the path (Lb). (DCO) also yields higher expected
utility relative to (La). To show this, note that U,(DCO) =
[(l-p)(6 3V - 5 2W(Ch )) + p(5
2
V - 6
2
W(K
£
))] > [(l-p)(6 3V - W(K
£
)) +
p(5
2
V - 6
2
W(K
£
))] > [(l-p)5 3V + P6 2V - W(K )] = U(La). The first
inequality follows because K. >^ ^u_i anc* C. >_ R, .
Comparing (DCO) and (HS), it is easy to check that player one
prefers (HS) when p < P* and (DCO) when p > P*. Further, P* > PI (2)
because:
P* =
W(R
2
) - W(Ch)(l-0 W(R ) - W(C )
>
— 2—
- > Pl(2).
5
2
[W(R
1
) + W(Ch )
- W(K
e
)] 6
2 [W(R
1
) - W(K^)]
This completes the proof of the proposition.
The generalization to any H = L-l follows immediately. Consider
H = 3, L = 4. The candidate SPE paths are (HS) if p < PE*, (Hb):
{C
h , 0, 0,
(R or 0), (R or 0)} if p > PE* , (DC): {0, Ch> R 2 ,
(R
1
or 0)} if p < P4(3,3) and (DCO): {0, 0, 0, (C h or K^), (R 2 or 0),
(R, or 0)} if p > P4(3,3). The result follows because
W(R
2
) - W(C )((l-6 2 )/6 2 )
P4(3
'
3)
- W(C h ) -W(K g ) + W( Rl ) + W(R ? )
and PE * > P4(3 ' 3) SlnCe
C, > K from (5.4). In general, PE* > P(H,L) for H > 2 and L > H and
so the proposition is true for any H = L-l. Further, this argument is
valid for any H
_< (L-l) since PE* is independent of H and L. This
completes the proof.
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Section 6. Characterizing the Equilibrium
In this section, I show that (under an additional assumption) the
project may not be completed whenever there is some probability (no
matter how small) that the project would be unfinished in a full-
information world.
S-l S
Specifically, suppose K, > E R and E R, < K„ < £ R . Then
^ q=o « o
1 l
~o q
the following lemma is provided in the appendix:
Lemma 6.1 Suppose L = 2 and S > 1. Define el(s) = W(C.)/W(R ).
Then:
(i) If p > el(S), the unique SPE is c. = C
Q
,
and from period 2,
(LS) if K = K. or if K = K, . The project is completed in S periods
only if K = K_. Otherwise the project is not completed.
(ii) If p < el(S), then the unique SPE path is c. =0 and, from
period 2, (LS) if K = K or if K = K . The project is completed in
(S+l) periods if K = K and is not finished if K = K, .
(iii) If p = el(S), both (i) and (ii) are SPE.
Note that any equilibrium path which involves a positive contribu-
tion in period 1 entails a risk, since the project may not be completed
with probability p. In fact, for p sufficiently low, the SPE in
Lemma 6.1 posits a zero contribution in period 1.
Now suppose there is a minimum contribution of x > that is re-
2quired in period 1. The minimum is "small" in that W(x)
_< 6 .W(C
?
).
x can be interpreted as the amount of investment required to "learn"
K in period L. Define e2(S) = W(x)/62S-1 V.
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2
Proposition 6.1 If p < e2(S) and W(x) _< 6 W(C ), then the project
will never be completed.
Proof Define e3(S) = [W(C
£
) - W(x)]/W(R ). From Lemma 6.1, it fol-
lows that:
(a) If p _> e3(S), the SPE is identical to part (i) of Lemma 6.1.
(b) If p <_ e3(S), the SPE path is C. = x and, from period 2, if
K = K
h
or (C^-x, R
s_r . . . , K { } if K
= K
£
.
Next, observe that e2(S)
_< e3(S) because W(R ).W(x)
_<
5
2S-1
V[W(C
Z
) - W(x)] (use the definition W(R
g
) = <5
2S~ 3 (l-6 2 ) and the
2
assumption W(x)
_< 5 ,W(C.)).
Finally, if p <_ e3(S) and player one follows the SPE path in part
2S-1(ii), his expected utility is p5 ' V - W(x). So when p < e2(S) _< e3(S),
his expected utility from participating in the project is negative.
Since he can always get at least zero by not participating, the result
follows.
Essentially, under the assumptions of Proposition 6.1, player
one's individual rationality constraint is violated. Strictly speak-
ing, this is not an inefficiency relative to the "first best" world
since a social planner also would not participate under the same cir-
cumstances. The following two results, proved by example in the
appendix, identifies the types of inefficiencies that could arise in
the bargaining procedure.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose H < L and the technology is low risk. If
(HS) is the SPE path, agents' total contributions will exceed the true
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project cost if the true costs are low. A social planner's total con-
tributions may not exceed the true project cost even when they are
low.
Proposition 6.3 Suppose the technology is risky. If (DCO) is the SPE
path, then agents contribute for (L-l) periods and complete the
project in (L-l+H) periods if the true costs are high. This comple-
tion time may be longer than the corresponding time in the first-best
optimum. It will always be longer than the corresponding time in the
full-information optimum.
(6.2) suggests that the bargaining procedure may be inefficient in
that agents may over-fund the project (ex-post this will appear like
a cost overrun). (6.3) says that the inefficiency may involve an
"unnecessary" delay in project completion (in addition to that in a
full-information world).
Section 7. Conclusion
I considered the problem of how two agents would provide for a
joint project when the cost of the project is initially uncertain.
Agents alternate in making contributions to the project. These con-
tributions should be considered as sunk costs which are borne by the
agent in the period in which the payment is made. Initially, agents
have access to a high cost technology but, in some future period L, a
cheaper technology may become available.
Suppose the cost technology is low risk—in the sense that the
difference between the high and low cost is "small." If the param-
eters of the model are such that, in any equilibrium, the project
-41-
cannot be completed prior to the revelation period L then two kinds of
agreements are possible. One, prior to period L agents contribute as
if costs were high for sure. Two, prior to period (L-l), agents'
contributions are again high but in period L-l they reduce their con-
tributions in anticipation of low costs. If they guess wrong and the
low-cost technology does not materialize in period L, agents must
re-switch to the higher contributions level.
If the project can be completed prior to period L by implementing
the this will be an equilibrium path. Under some conditions, this
early completion result will hold independently of the probability of
the high cost being realized.
The second set of results relate to the case of risky technology
—
i.e., when the cost differences are "large." In equilibrium, agents
may contribute nothing prior to period L.
Two types of inefficiencies (relative to the first-best optimum)
were identified. First, agents may contribute in excess of the true
cost—thus over-funding the project. Second, agents may delay the
project "unnecessarily" by contributing nothing for several periods.
This delay is in addition to that caused by agents' lack of commitment
in the full-information world.
The results of this paper is sensitive to the particular assumption
regarding how the two costs affect outcome. Without this assumption,
the low contributions schedule would always be chosen. An alternative
is to make the revelation period L a random variable—this implies
that the lower cost technology will be available at any time with
positive probability. Unfortunately, attempts to generalize
-42-
technological risk by making the difference in completion times
between the two technologies under perfect information a random var-
iable has proved unsuccessful.
-43-
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 4.1 First I prove a result for H = 2.
Claim 1 Suppose H - 2 and L = 3. If C,(2) = R- , then the SPE path is
(a) (DC) if p < ql(2) and (b) (HS) if p > ql(2).
Proof The candidate profiles are:
(HS) (C
h (2), Rj}
(DC) {0, Ch (2), (Rj or Rj-k)} if p < ql(2)
(DCL) {0, C £(2), (k or R^, ^ or 0)} if p > ql(2)
(LS) {C
£
(2), k, (R
x
or Rj-k)} if p < q3(2)
(LLS) (C
£
(2), 0, (k or R^, (Rj or 0)} if p > q3(2)
Observe that q3 > ql . Consider p _< ql(2). Clearly (DC) is pre-
ferred to (LS) by player one. Comparing (HS) and (DC), q4(2,3) =
at C,(2) = R . When p _> q3(2), (DCL) is preferred to (LLS). Compar-
ing (HS) and (DCL), player one's utility under (DCL) is strictly lower
3
than 6 V and therefore his utility under (HS). When p e [ql(2) q3(2)],
compare (DCL) and (LS). For p > W(C
£
(2))/5 2 [W(R ) - W(R -k)] = q6
,
player one prefers (DCL) to (LS). Now the result is unaffected by
whether q6 ^ q3 . So, without loss of generality, assume that
q6 > q3. This proves the claim.
Now consider H = 3 and L = 4.
Claim 2 Suppose H = 3, L = 4 and C,(3) < R,,. Then:
(i) If q* > q5(3,4), the unique SPE path is (DC) if p <_ q* and
(DCL) if p > q*.
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(ii) If q* < q5(3,4), the unique SPE path is (DC) if p < q*, (HS)
if p e [q* q5(3,4)] and (DCL) if p _> q5(3,4).
Proof The candidate profiles are:
(HS) (C
h
(3), R
2
,
R
x
> if P _>qE K2)
(HOS) (C
h (3), 0, R 2 , (Rj or R^k)} if p^qE l(2)
(DC) {0, Ch (3), R 2 , (R 1 or Rj-k)} if p < q*
(DCL) {0, Ch(3), R 2"k, (k or^), (Rj or 0)} if p _> q*.
The paths with c, = C»(3) are ignored since (DC) and (DCL) will
always be preferred to them. Also observe that qF l(2) = q*. So con-
sider p <_ q*. By observation, (DC) is always preferred to (HOS). If
p >_ q*, (HS) is preferred to (DCL) if p < q5(3,4) by definition of q5.
The result follows immediately.
If C
h (3)
= R
3
,
note that qE 5(3,4) = so that q* > q £5(3,4). This
proves part (a) of the lemma. Now consider H = 4, L = 5. If
c = C (4), in the period 2 sub-game G(4,3) C,(3) = R_ and so player
two's optimal contribution is 0. This rules out the path (HS) for
H = 3 and so for all H > 3. This proves part (b) of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Suppose the result holds for H = N and
L = T, where T is even and T/2 < N < (T-l). Consider H = N+l and
L = T+l. By the induction hypothesis, the candidate SPE profiles in
the G(L,H) game are (HS) if p <_ q 4(N-1 ,T-1) and p E [q* q 5(n,T)];
(DC) if p e [q4(N-l,T-l) q*] and (DCL) if p _>q5(N,T). Profiles in-
volving zero contributions at any time other than period 1 are ig-
nored since they can never be part of any SPE path.
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Suppose p <_ q* and compare (HS) and (DC). Since L is odd, q4(H,L)
is defined. Further q4(H,L) = q4(N+l,T+l) = q£4(N-l,T-l)
-
T-N
W(Ch )(l-5
i
)
W(R ) - W(R -k) < ^e4^
-1
'
1" 1 )' Then, by definition of q4 , the SPE
path is (HS) for p <_ q4(H,L) and (DC) for p e [q4(H,L)q*].
Suppose p > q* and compare (HS) and (DCL). Since L = (T+l) is
odd, player one does not move in period (L-l) and so does not benefit
from the switch to (LS) in that period. Therefore, player one's
utility is strictly higher under (HS) and so (HS) is the SPE path for
p e (q* q 5(N,T)), the probability range over which (HS) is defined.
Li
This proves part (i) of the proposition. An analogous proof holds for
part (ii).
Proof of Lemma 6.1 The candidate profiles are:
(LOS) {C
£
; {\_ lt .-., R x > if K = K £ or if K = K^}
(0) {0, {C
£
,
R
R_ 1 ,
..., R
x
) or 0}
(HL) {C
h ;
{(Rjj.j-k), Rj^, ..., 0} or 0}.
Clearly the choice is between (LOS) and (0). The period 1 benefit is
W(C.) if (0) is followed but at the cost of a one-period delay rela-
tive to period S if K = K . Since this cost is p.W(R ), the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 6.2 First, 1 provide an example where L = 2 but
both the bargaining and planning procedures result in immediate com-
pletion. The data assumed is: 5 = 0.5, V = 10, W(-7) = 0.09,
W(l) = 3.75, W(l«2) = 5, W(2-l) = 10 10 and W(0 is linear between
these points. These number imply R = 1 »2 and R
?
= 1.
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Example 1; No over-investment: Assume X, = 1.2, K. = 0.7 and L = 2.
Check, that k = 0.5 < R. as required. Since H = 1, the bargaining
solution is immediate completion by contributing 1.2. If the planner
does the same, his utility is V(HS) = 20 = W(1.2) = 15. If he wants
to wait till period 2 his utility is strictly less than 5.(2V) = 10.
Example 2: Over-investment in bargaining Assume X, = 2.19,
X
£
= 1.4, L = 3. Since H = 2 , by Claim 1 of the appendix, (HS) will
be a SPE path for some probability values, where:
(HS) Cl^-Rj), Rj} = {0.99, 1.2}.
If the planner also wants early completion, (HS) is his optimal path
with utility V(HS) = (0.5)20 - W(.99) - (0.5) W(1.2) = 3.872. But
there is a better path:
(EQ) {0.7, 0.7, (0.7 or 0)}.
Check that V(EQ) = («5) 2 20 - W(«7)(l + 0*5) - (1-p) • (0. 5)
2
W(0. 7
)
5 - (0.09 + 0.045) - (l-p)(0.0225) >_ 4.8425 > V(HS).
Proof of Proposition 6.3 Assume the same data used in the previous
proof (other than the cost data) and follow the same procedure.
Example 1: No delay Suppose X = 2.9, X = 0.69 and L = 2. Then
H = 3, X^ < R k > (R + R ) and X > R
4
= (0.25) 2 (3.75) = 0.015,
as required. I will show that both bargaining and planning involves
completion in four period if X = K, and two periods if X = X . In
bargaining, (DCO) is the unique SPE path for p > 0.9 where:
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(DCO) {0, (-7 or -69), (1 or 0), (1.2 or 0)}.
The planner's best path is:
(EQ) {-7, («7 or 0), -7 or 0), (-8 or 0)}
and yields utility V(EQ) = 2.18(l-p) + lOp.
If he wants to finish earlier, his best option is {«7, (1 or 0),
(1.2 or 0)} with utility equal to [ 1 . 7 9 ( 1
-p ) + lOp] < V(EQ).
Example 2: Delay in Bargaining With the same data, assume that L = 4,
In bargaining, (DCO) is a SPE path where:
(DCO) {0, 0, 0, (0.7 or .69), (1 or 0), (1.2 or 0)}
Project completion is in six periods if K = K, and four periods if
K = K
g
, The planner's best path is:
(EQ) {-7, -7, .7, (.8 or 0)}
where V(EQ) = 2.18. He finishes in exactly four periods. Observe
that under full-information completion is in three periods if K = K,
and one period if K = K , which is earlier than the first-best.
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NOTES
For a similar mechanism, but with simultaneous contributions, see
Palfrey and Rosenthal [5].
2The disutility costs of contributing instead of R, in period 1
are (1) a one-period delay in project completion time and (2) changes
in the sequence of contributions. By definition, R is equal to the
sum of these costs. For q ^ 2, both these costs are decreasing in q*.
Between q = 1 and q = 2, however, although the first cost still de-
creases the second cost increases which explains the ambiguity of the
relationship between R. and R~
.
3
This calculation follows directly from Remark 1.2. Consider the
sub-game beginning in period (L-H+l). Then player one is the second
2H—
2
L.—H 2H—
2
mover in that sub-game and gets 6 V in equilibrium, or 5 »5 V
in the whole game.
4
Strictly speaking, since C, < R, and H = 3, the statement of
Lemma 4.1 does not cover this case. However, the result is similar
and the proof in the appendix does cover H = 3 as well as H = 2.
To keep the statement of the proposition simple, 1 will ignore
the non-generic equilibrium path where there is a zero contribution in
period 1 and then agents follow (HS).
This is because the delay cost in contributing rather than C,
is (l-p)W(R ) while benefits are exactly W(R, T ).H H.
This can be computed as follows. Suppose the game started in
period L and player one contributed RTT instead of C, in that period.H h r
From Remark 1.2, the disutility from delay is (l-p).W(Ru ). AdjustingH
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for the C, contribution and discounting, the period 1 disutility works
out as given.
o
Note that, by Lemma 5.1, an equilibrium path will never involve
a contribution of C, prior to period (L-l). The path {0, ..., 0; C,
in period (L-l); ...} yields strictly lower utility relative to (HS)
for p < P1(H).
9
For H = 2, L = 3 substitute P* for PE* everywhere.
In a "first best" world, contributions are made by a single agent
with cost function W(0 and benefit 2V from project completion.
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